

Enclosure A to  
IAC-D-80/5  
21 March 1955

10 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

FROM: Chairman, Scientific Estimates Committee

SUBJECT: SEC 3-55: Critical Deficiencies in  
Biological Warfare Intelligence

1. The Scientific Estimates Committee has reviewed deficiencies in biological warfare intelligence in compliance with the IAC action directing that "the SEC determine the critical deficiencies in BW intelligence and recommend to the IAC means of eliminating them" (IAC-D-80, as approved in IAC-M-138).

2. Production of SEC 2-54, "Estimate of Soviet Biological Warfare Capabilities through 1960," demonstrated that there is sufficient information concerning indirect factors to permit an acceptable estimate of Soviet Bloc scientific and technological capabilities to conduct BW activities. However, in regard to direct information, it was noted that the extent of our knowledge of Soviet biological warfare activities per se is so meager that it does not provide positive or conclusive proof of the existence or of the magnitude of a Soviet biological warfare program. Little progress has been made toward confirming the existence of a Soviet BW program since production of SEC 2-54, nor is there reason to expect that the critical gaps can be soon or easily eliminated.

3. BW intelligence activities in the past have been hampered primarily by:

a. the lack of emphasis on BW intelligence, which resulted in inadequate effort in this field. As interpreted by the SEC, DCID 4/4 in its paragraphs Id, IId, and IIId provides the intelligence community with the requisite priority to conduct highest and high priority programs in BW intelligence.

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b. The lack of success in distinguishing between BW research and normal activities in public health, veterinary medicine, agriculture, and other related fields of biological science. This problem of isolating unique features of BW research has impeded the analytic effort and complicated guidance to the collectors.

4. In determining the specific deficiencies in BW intelligence, the needs of the following agencies and departments in addition to the intelligence components of the IAC agencies and departments were solicited: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), the Chemical Corps of the Army (CMLC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). The critical deficiencies are listed in Tab A. It should be noted that existing gaps in our intelligence concerning Soviet capabilities for defense against BW attack are not listed in Tab A because, in the opinion of the SEC which in part stems from the interpretation of DCID 4/4, such deficiencies are not so critical to the national security as those relating to Soviet offensive capabilities in biological warfare.

5. In order to eliminate the deficiencies in BW intelligence and to conduct BW intelligence activities at a scale commensurate with the priority accorded BW intelligence by DCID 4/4, it is recommended that:

a. The collection capabilities be enhanced by:

(1) Clarifying within command channels the responsibilities of BW or BW-CW intelligence officers [REDACTED] and placing proper emphasis on BW collection activities in conformity with the concepts of DCID 4/4. **25X6**

(2) Establishing research programs to develop technical aids for BW intelligence collection.

b. Effectiveness of intelligence officers having responsibilities in the BW intelligence field be improved by:

(1) Allocating increased time in the collector training programs to BW intelligence.

(2) Further educating analysts in biological warfare research, development and practices.

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(3) Making arrangements for more widespread access  
to and providing instruction of BW analysts [REDACTED]

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c. Guidance and support to collectors be improved by:

(1) Increasing emphasis on the development and  
circulation of current coordinated information requirements.

(2) Preparing detailed background information on  
specific targets for their use.

(3) Establishing closer working relations between  
those responsible for placing BW requirements and those responsible  
for conducting covert operations.

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